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The purpose of this article is to focus attention on the decision process which made 
over a thousand men redundant at State Dockyard, Newcastle, NSW. In the past, 
attention has been focused on labour market effects with social issues almost entirely 
neglected. We seek to highlight the imbalance of power which exists between employer 
interests, trade unions and workers. Dockyard workers endeavoured to resist 
redundancy and their means of protest were a reflection of the power base available to 
them. What emerges is an inability of workers to successfully resist redundancy. 
Redundancy - Introduction 
Redundancy represents a severe social and economic problem for workers 
particularly when unemployment is increasing regionally and nationally. An 
Australian Federal government decision, towards the end of 1976, to have two ships 
for the Australian National Line (ANL) built in Japan ensured the redundancy of 
about 1,150 manual workers and 150 administrative and technical staff at the State 
Dockyard, Newcastle, NSW. This represented about two thirds of the total work 
force. Redundancies of such magnitude in a specific industry have been rare in 
Australia (at least since World War Two). The trek out the gate began in October 1976 
and continued until the total work force was reduced to about 550 men 12 months 
later. Those men who remained were engaged mainly on ship repair and general 
engineering work. 
Redundancy is not a new phenomenon. It has been with us for hundreds of years. 
However, since World War Two, the concern for full employment policies in most 
western economies has brought greater recognition and increased publicity for people 
who have been made redundant. "Circumstances and attitudes have changed radically 
from the nineteenth century notion that employees harshly affected by technological 
change should bear the brunt of their misfortune without help.'' 1 Several European 
countries have introduced redundancy legislation2 and, following the 1963 Richard's 
report, the NSW State government legislated for those cases where redundancy was 
caused by technological change. The South Australian Industrial Court has also 
exercised its jurisdictional powers in this respect. 3 Nevertheless, these actions do not 
satisfy an Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) requirement of four weeks pay 
for every year of service. Generally, Australian initiatives have relied upon trade union 
power to secure monetary compensation which is either written into awards or 
negotiated on an ad hoc basis. 
*Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Economics and Commerce, University of Newcastle, Australia. 
I Yerbury (1973, p.254). Redundancy at the Dockyard was not caused by technological change. howcvt:r. 
Yerbury's comment has general applicability. 
1 Employment Protection Act /975. paras 44 46. Sweden, West Germany, Belgium, Holland and France 
have various statutory provisions regarding redundancy. 
3 As a result o.f Mr Justice Richard's report (1963), a provision in the Industrial Arbitration Act of NSW, 
Section 88G, provides for insertion into an award or agreement of not less than three months' notice of an 
impending redundancy. The South Australian Industrial Court has ruled that a Commissioner has power to 
include in an award provisions for redundancy. (See Federated Miscellaneous Workers' Union (SA) v 
Adelaid~ Milk Supply Co-Op Ltd, [1978) AILR 418 and 528. See also Fisher, (1969, p.212). The recent 
Co'!'monwea/th Employees (Redeployment and Retirement) Act /979 provides six months and 12 months 
notace of redundancy for public servants. There is also a right of appeal. 
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The social aspects of redundancy have received insufficient attention in the 
literature. As Wood noted, "The central concern is in how redundants fare in the 
labour market". (Wood, 1977, p.52) Most studies have emphasised economic 
considerations and dealt with redundancy from the point of dismissal. These date 
frorn Kahn ( 1956), Wedderburn ( 1964, 1965), Sams and Simpson ( 1968), Mackay and 
Reid (1972), Daniel (1970, 1972), and Herron (1972, 1975). Admittedly some 
researchers have acknowledged social and psychological effects and state more could 
be done, although in what way is not made clear. 
The Department of Productivity, in 1977, began a survey of redundancy procedures 
in Australia. Their survey of four industry groups showed 282 companies had at one 
time or another experienced redundancy. (Pouncz, 1979) However, apart from the 
recent research of Aungles and Szelenyi ( 1979) into redundant shipyard workers at 
Whyalla, and that of Smith (1978) who investigated the experiences of 60 textile 
\VOrkers, redundancy has received scant attention in Australia. Redundancy would 
probably not be an issue at all if full employment still existed in Australia. 
What is Meant by Redundancy? 
The growing criticism that redundancy research has been too limited in scope and 
concentrated almost exclusively on labour market effects may arise from the meaning 
redundancy conveys to those analysing it. In many human situations effects are 
observable and can be subjected to measurement by the observer, whereas causes on 
the other hand are buried deep in human consciousness, rooted in social mores, craft 
traditions and as a result, difficult to pinpoint. For example, it is generally easier to 
examine the effects of a strike than it is to uncover the causes. Clearly redundancy as a 
word in general use conveys something surplus or unwanted and no longer useful. This 
may be why most research has been in the area of post-redundancy. Answers to 
questions why labour has become surplus to requirements are couched usually in 
rational economic terms with passing reference only to social implications. 
One of the earliest post-World War Two redundancy studies was conducted by 
Kahn (1956). Kahn recognised that the social and economic aspects of redundancy are 
not discrete. Redundancy is defined, '' ... as applied to human beings is an excess or 
superfluity of labour, due to a change- however caused- in some aspect of the market 
situation". (p.l9) Since Kahn's study is concerned with labour market mobility and 
the ease or difficulty of finding a job, her attention was focused on effects and not 
creation of redundancy. Redundancy is accepted as a given and an inevitable feature 
of market mutations. The underlying factor which causes market changes may be a 
feature of the social and economic order. By whose decree does labour become 
surplus? This opens the matter of power relationships. It might be argued that the 
spirit of capitalism is a major cause in that labour can be expelled like an evil spirit in 
order to protect capital. Since Kahn's work appeared, the concept of "property rights 
in a job" has arisen to challenge the hegemony of capital over labour. Many European 
cou11tries during the last decade have reported major work-ins, sit-ins, or plant 
occupations. 4 
The OECD in a redundancy study which contrasted four separate industries in the 
USA and UK defined redundant workers - " ... comprise~ those wh'l need to make a 
permanent adjustment as a result of lasting structural changes, not as a consequence 
of cyclical or seasonal factors". (Smith, 1966) The OECD version is wider in scope 
than that of Kahn. A structural change could arise from a number of reasons not 
rest ric ted to market mutations. However, the criticism offered against Kahn's view of 
redundancy is also applicable to the OECD version. While the effects of 
redundancy are important as part of the total redundancy situation, the pre-
redundancy decision and how it arises should be included in any definition of 
redundancy. 
4 For a discussion of worker sit-ins, see Mills, (1976). 
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Sole concentration on post-redundancy ov~erlooks the importance of power and its 
distribution in society. Pow~er in the final analysis is exercised unilaterally because of 
the hierarchical nature of our society. The rank and file seldom have an opportunity to 
provide alternatives and reject redundancy altogether. Plans are oft,en made in secret 
and released as a fait accompli to trade unions and workers who have very little time to 
muster countervailing power. As Wood has noted, workers are forced out. (Wood, 
1977, p.58) Clearly if a minority group can force out another larger group, the former 
relies on power to achieve its aims. Hence power emerges as an important ingredient of 
redundancy creation. 
Furthermore workers are forced out through no fault of their own. On occasions it 
may appear that workers have contributed to their own demise by persistent go-slows, 
and the disruptive tactics of agitators, etc. This reasoning cannot be sustained and is 
misleading. It fails to acount for the socio-economic structure, the institutional 
arrangements and the climate of industrial relations. 
Redundancy creation and the treatment of redundant workers is fundamentally 
dependent upon what society is prepared to tolerate. When redundancies occur, 
workers are forced out despite resistance and presumably through no fault of their 
own. Hence redundancy is a situation in a socio-economic structure where an elite 
group uses its power to rescind the jobs of another group for whatever reason, forcing 
them despite resistance (if any) to leave the work place with no foreseeable prospect of 
re-engagement. 
Redundancy at State Dockyard, Newcastle, NSW 
The role played by the Industries Assistance Commission (lAC) and the Federal 
government as actors in the events leading up to redundancy deserve attention for the 
government used the lAC report as the mainspring of its actions which created 
redundancy. The Federal government on 18 August 1976 asked the lAC ''whether in 
the light of cost movements in ship building since the Tariff Board' last reported in 
1971 any changes are necessary in the assistance accorded the industry in order to 
sustain economic production in Australia''. (lAC, 1976) 
One month later, the lAC reported: ''The Commission concludes that the 
production of large vessels by Dockyard and BHP is now and is likely to remain, 
uneconomic". (lAC, 1976, p.75) The lAC noted that no real attempt had been made by 
shipbuilders to divert resources to small ship construction as recommended in the 1971 
report. If this prior recommendation had been adopted, excess capacity in small ship 
construction may have been the result of BHP and State Dockyard entering that sector 
of the market. The effective rate of assistance currently afforded local production was 
noted by the lAC to exceed 100 percent for larger ships. (lAC, 1976, p.74) The lAC 
referred to the multiplicity of trade unions and the disruptive effects of demarcation 
disputes. 
While cogent argument can be developed to favour amalgamation of trade unions, 
demarcation disputes were not unique to State Dockyard and in any case, multiple 
unions are a conunon feature of Australian labour organization. Secondly, protection 
in the form of subsidies, tariffs and import quotas is provided over a wide range of 
Australian rural and secondary industries. Shipbuilders in European countries are 
granted a number of protective measures against foreign competition. Credit facilities, 
research contributions, fiscal assistance, direct subsidies etc., are but a few. (OECD, 
1976) Shipbuilding since time immemorial has been subject to sudden cyclical 
variations in supply and demand. Many countries have sought to protect shipbuilding 
from sudden fluctuations and marginal pricing competition particularly from Asian 
yards. 
5 Predecessor of the Industries Assistance Commission. 
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The NSW and South Australian State Labour governments in their evidence to the 
lAC admitted shipbuilding needed reorganisation. The NSW government asked for 
special assistance to permit re-equipment and modernisation at State Dockyard. 
Dockyard management had made repeated pleas for nearly twenty years to their State 
minister, first for a graving dock and later a floating dock. The Dockyard had known 
only shoe string financing since its inception during World War Two. 
The usual prevarication between State and Commonwealth governments appears as 
a major reason why a comprehensive long term modernisation programme did not 
eventuate at State Dockyard. Neither government wanted to accept full responsibility. 
The State government was the employer but thought the Federal government should 
contribute financially towards a major modernisation because of the defence link. The 
Federal government apparently wanted no further involvement beyond its subsidy 
contribution. 
BHP was the only ship operator to make a submission to the lAC " ... that the costs 
of any scheme recommended by the Commission to support shipbuilding in Australia 
be borne totally as a community cost and not as a cost to shipowners and ship 
operators''. (lAC 1976, p.6) The BHP submission indicates a curious attitude to state 
and private capital arrangements. The BHP case while directed presumably at their 
own shipyard in Whyalla, South Australia, may well have contributed indirectly to the 
Federal government's attitude to shipbuilding late in 1976. (Aungles and Szelenyi, 
1979, pp.29-32) 
Shipping industry submissions to the lAC emphasised non-economic issues. These 
related to defence, the island continent and social effects on the region. The lAC 
rejected these arguments. The Federal government's reference to the lAC was 
confined to economic issues. The lAC in the light of submissions made to it, did 
exan1ine human effects of unemployment (lAC 1976, pp. 79-83) but they were not 
analysed in depth because personal hardship was measured in economic terms only, 
presumed to be short run and dependent on the job market. As it happened, many 
skilled tradesmen had to accept work outside their trade - often unskilled work - and 
many could find no job at all. A number finished up leaving their trade in disgust. 
The lAC would probably claim: first, they must adhere to their terms of reference 
and secondly, since they are an advisory body, it is for government to decide whether 
the hard cold facts of economic logic need modification; since federation Federal 
governments have often done so, particularly in the rural sector. 
Since people do not live their lives entirely according to the strict tenets of economic 
logic, advisory bodies such as the lAC should be restructured to provide more broadly 
based reports which emphasize the social consequences of economic advice. Skilled 
advisors are required in areas other than economics, otherwise the imbalance of policy 
recommendations based on rational economic man (a mythical and inhuman figure) 
\Viii on many occasions continue to create human misery. 
It could be argued that the Federal government and advisory bodies such as the lAC 
function as integral components of the ruling elite structure - pawn~ in the interests of 
capital. Capital is a much more mobile factor than labour and can be withdrawn and 
reinvested where its economic return will be highest. If excess supply occurs because of 
previous over-investment, then capital is withdrawn and reinvested elsewhere. 
The Suez crisis created a heavy demand for larger ships which resulted in worldwide 
excess supply and shipbuilding in Australia faced a bleak period from 1974 onwards 
especially with marginal cost pricing competition from Asian shipyards. Ships built i~ 
Australia were no longer competitive and could be purchased much cheaper from 
overseas yards. 
Following BHP's intention stated to the lAC to retrench I, 720 employees at its own 
:Vhyalla shipy~rd by mid-1978, the Federal government was not disposed to offer an 
tncreased. substdy to State Dockyard. Nor is Newcastle important politically to a 
conservative Federal government since the city returns huge majorities for the Labour 
Party. 
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The Federal goverrunenl' s refusal to i ncr case the subsidy and the placing of orders 
for two new ships with Japanese yards invited serious questioning of the socio-
econornic order. What \vas forgotten \'las that tnany men had invested a considerable 
portion of human capital in the industry. They were invited to work at the Dockyard 
when shipbuilding was considered economically viable. Later when shipbuilding was 
considered uneconomic, labour was dispensed with and men were thrown on the job 
market with little concern for, their welfare. 
The lAC was aware of the redundancy spectre facing Dockyard workers and their 
prospect of finding alternative employment at a time of escalating unemployment in 
the Hunter Valley. (lAC 1976, pp.77-79) Hardship was experienced by many skilled 
metal tradesmen and electricians. The lAC recognised the unemployment multiplier 
effects in industries dependent upon Dockyard contracts. However, the human 
hardship argument did not deter the lAC from its main course: ''... it appears 
probable that construction of large ships must cease sooner or later and postponement 
of such action would only ~ncrease the costs involved". (lAC .1976, p. 76) So the 
preservation of economic capital prevailed over human capital. The spectre of human 
redundancies will not disappear under such circumstances. Nor will the efforts of 
manpower planning be beneficial, if the interests of capital predominate. In fact, it 
could be argued that manpower planning is not essential to a capitalist economic 
system if human redundancies are to be accepted as an inevitable feature of economic 
-progress. 
It should not be assumed that economic considerations are unimportant. The 
efficient use of resources at individual or national level is a desirable aim but not at the 
almost total exclusion of the rights of human capital. In an advanced economy, capital 
and labour need each other. 
It is more than a reasonable surmise that the Federal government expected the lAC 
to conclude as it did after the latter's 1971 report. Commercial shipbuilding in 
Australia had been leading a hand to mouth existence for many years. This 
contributed to a high degree of employment uncertainty in the industry for both 
management and workers. Our survey of ex-Dockyard workers showed that only 13 
percent were greatly surprised when the official decision to retrench came through. 
Did the lAC merely endorse the inevitable? Their terms of reference were confined 
to economic criteria. Had the lAC been given a wider brief to investigate a 
restructuring of the industry and a modernisation programme, the recommendation 
may have been different, particularly if in-depth social research had been carried out. 
Instead, workers were the victims of over twenty years of negligence. 
Evidence to the lAC 1976 enquiry showed that $40 million to $50 million would be 
needed to modernise facilities at State Dockyard. The yard's equipment and layout 
necessitated double handling during ship construction. (lAC, 1976, p.25) Our own 
survey revealed that workers were very critical of the state of technology, equipment 
and inadequate capacity. Yet the standard of craftsmanship was high and praised 
frequently by shipowners and crew as being second to none. It is difficult indeed to 
compete on favourable terms indefinitely and tender against overseas yards who have 
not only modern technology but strong support from their governments. 
Early in 1977, a decision was made by the NSW State government to purchase a 
floating dock for ship repair work. The Federal government refused any financial 
sharing with the State government. However, the State government claimed it could 
not afford the millions of dollars required for modernisation without Federal 
government assistance. In spite of higher service charges on investment capital, earlier 
modernisation may have made the Dockyard more competitive. 
The lAC also noted, '' ... scaling down would cause social and regional problems, 
which the Commission suggests should be reduced by the provision of adequate 
assistance". (lAC, 1976, p.76) What assistance the Commission had in mind was not 
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disclosed. The Federal government ignored the suggestion altogether. No special 
assistance was provided for redundant Dockyard workers other than what was 
normally available. Most men initially sought assistance from the Commonwealth 
Employment Service (CES). The CES was not given extra staff to cope with the task of 
finding jobs for hundreds of redundant men. The CES also provided an on-site service 
at the Dockyard but could do little to assist redundant workers because unemployment 
was already high for many of the occupational skills held by Dockyard workers. Men 
who found jobs did so mainly through friends, relatives and by calling on firms 
personally. The remainder had to accept unemployment benefits, the maximum 
assistance provided by the Federal government. As stated earlier, the Federal 
government was safe in the knowledge it had nothing to lose politically. If the 
Newcastle region had had one or two marginal parliamentary seats, government policy 
may have been different. 
The Feder'al government did make an offer unilaterally on ~ take it or leave it basis; 
they would increase the subsidy for construction of two ships at the State Dockyard 
for the Australian National Line (ANL) from 35 percent to 59 percent provided the 
NSW government and trade unions signed a 13 clause contract. The key elements of 
the contract were, (i) no wage increases other than wage indexation; (ii) no change in 
conditions which would add to costs; (iii) no strikes, bans, demarcation disputes; (iv) 
if completion was delayed beyond the contract date, the ACTU and trade unions to pay 
liquidated damages. Furthermore the NSW government (as employer) was required to 
indemnify ANL if any breach of the industrial relations contract occurred. An 
extraordinary and unprecedented feature was the non-negotiability of the industrial 
contract. The Federal government indulged in a blatant abuse of power which was to 
become known in industrial relations circles as "crashing through". Surely here was 
an example that pluralist devotees would not wish to recall. There can be only 
industrial anarchy without negotiation - something trade unions are told frequently. 
A more positive and constructive approach would have been for the Federal 
government to have entered into a joint shipyard financial agreement wth the NSW 
government. To have offered to undertake a complete restructuring of the Dockyard 
and to modernise facilities in consultation with the NSW government, Dockyard 
personnel, the ACTU and trade unions. This would have removed much of the 
uncertainty and insecurity which had plagued the Dockyard for many years. The 
Dockyard malaise should have been conceived of as an industry problem and not by 
attaching blame to any one group. Certainly not trade unions, who most often react to 
decisions in which they have had no prior participation. A genuine and sincere form of 
industrial democracy may well have led to constructive improvements. 
In the light of hindsight, it appears the Federal government's non-negotiable 
package was designed to be rejected by the ACTU, trade unions and the men. If it had 
been accepted, the style of "crashing through" may have become more widespread 
and open industrial warfare a distinct possibility. The ACTU and trade unions were 
\veil aware of the dangerous precedent behind the Federal government's proposals. It 
was beyond trade union power to accept the principles inherent in the proposals. 
The NSW premier thought the offer was designed to provoke the reaction which the 
unions had made. The local city newspaper in an editorial stated, "The government did 
not make an offer; it proposed a form of industrial bondage that was completely 
outside the mainstream of Australia's recent industrial history and contemporary 
experience.'' (Newcastle morning herald, 24th November, 1976) The insensitive 
statements of one or two Federal ministers appeared to indicate the Federal 
government's intention to dismantle shipbuilding irrespective of evidence placed 
before it. A full meeting of Dockyard workers rejected the Federal government's 
industrial contract and became martyrs for their industrial principles. The Federal 
government placed orders for two ships with Japanese shipyards soon afterwards. 
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Several Federal ministers echoed the view that Dockyard \vorkers were irresponsible 
and strike prone; a widely disseminated view held generally in the Newcastle region 
and other parts of Australia. The saga goes back to earlier coa·l mining disputes \vhen 
other Australian cities, reliant on Hunter Valley black coal for electricity generation, 
experienced winter blackouts. Unfortunately full regional data on industrial disputes 
does not exist to disentangle fact from myth. Fortunately regional dispute figures have 
been available for coalmining and stevedoring. Gordon has shown that for ten years 
1965-66 to 19'/4-75, "the coalmines on the Newcastle field have only twice exceeded 
the annual State average for the percentage of man-shifts lost due to industrial 
disputes. The South Maitland mines have been in excess of that average in only one 
year. Turning to the waterfront . . . Newcastle waterside workers have been 
significantly less dispute prone than their counterparts in other major ports." (Gordon, 
1977) Gordon provided data from official reports to substantiate his remarks. Full 
regional statistics on industrial disputes may well explode the myth that Newcastle 
workers are dispute prone. 
Dockyard management, trade unions and workers reacted vigorously to the Federal 
government's action. Protest was voiced by the City Council and various civic groups 
in Newcastle. Evidence from the influential Hunter Valley Research Foundation was 
sent to Canberra. Management confined themselves mainly to official channels of the 
State government network. The threat of closure naturally brought management and 
trade unions together. 
The means of protest available to trade unions and workers \Vas determined by their 
inferior power base. They were not made privy to Federal government decisions and 
were generally the last to receive information. Lack of prior consultation placed trade 
unions in a rectionary situation. Despite their disadvantaged position, the men were 
prepared to resist and resorted to various forms of protest to convey dismay at their 
plight and a refusal to accept what they saw as an injustice. Massed meetings of 
workers were held to plan counter actions. Street marches were held in Newcastle to 
enlist local support. There was a meeting with the Japanese Ambassador and a 
temporary ban was placed on Japanese colliers. Several bus trips were made to 
Canberra to lobby Federal parliamentarians. A three man committee had a fruitless 
interview with the Prime Minister and a tent embassy was erected outside Parliament 
House, Canberra. The Dockyard Works Committee sought the intervention of the 
influential ACTU President who came to Newcastle but his efforts also proved 
fruitless. 
Often the men's actions drew censure from governments, news media and 
community groups, who misunderstood the strong feelings of pride possessed by 
shipyard workers. Theirs is a craft industry and men identify with every ship. Witness, 
for example, the rites at shiplaunchings. The men wanted to keep on building ships 
and preserve their jobs. These and other traditions helped shape the men's conflict 
stance to redundancy. Shipbuilding, as with coal mining and stevedoring, has a long 
tradition of drawing battle lines. the relationship between conflict and industry 
structure is not always well understood by observers. (Eldridge, 1968) 
After about three months, the men's efforts proved abortive. The Federal 
government would not budge from its industrial relations contract. The ACTU and 
trade unions were forced to accept the lack of power in their situation. Another victory 
had been posted for the ruling elites. The only thing left was to fight for the best 
conditions on behalf of potential redundants. 
Work-ins, and sit-ins have received a lot of publicity as a form of worker protest 
against redundancy in overseas countries. Work-ins hold tremendous implications for 
the future of trade union organisation, employee relations and organisation of 
industry. As a form of protest work-in was not available to shipbuilding workers at 
State Dockyard. Obviously orders were needed to build ships, with large financial 
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reserves, sympathetic governments and co-operation of management. Besides the 
time horizon between notice of redundancy and shipbuilding cessation was too short 
to consider alternative products. 
The State government as the employer did attempt to save some jobs by its decision 
to order a new floating dock from Japan. Orders were placed for two small harbour 
ferries and a hundred school class room demountables. The State government did 
establish a task force to advise it on the future potential of the Dockyard. The State 
government was unable to place many Dockyard tradesmen, semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers in public employment in Newcastle and very few men were prepared 
to leave Newcastle and reside in Sydney. 
Considerations of financial compensation dominate redundancy policy in most 
countries. Economic difficulties faced by redundants are certainly important. 
Ho\vever, job security often means much more to the average worker (Seglow, 1970, 
p. 7) Paterson has observed that workers will often opt for money because they have so 
fe\v opportunities for capital accumulation and readily accept the financial 
compensation to buy a new car, to refurnish, to reduce home mortgage etc. (Paterson, 
1978) The concept of property rights in a job have not made much headway as yet in 
Australia. Perhaps there was little need for concern until serious unemployment levels 
e1nerged in 1974. 
When it came to bargaining with the State government over severance terms, the 
trade unions were once again in an inferior power position. Hundreds of men were 
about to lose their jobs and the combined union committee was anxious to obtain the 
best terms. The trade unions had very few precedents to guide them. The State 
government was not prepared to be magnanimous. Governments and their treasury 
advisors are very conscious of precedent. The final sev_erance deal was worth two weeks 
pay for every year of service up to a maximum of ten years. This was unjust for long 
serving Dockyard workers. 
The twelve months to September 1977 saw about I, 150 workers at State Dockyard 
lose their jobs through no fault of their own. This paper has endeavoured to show that 
\Vhen redundancy is created, the power of workers to combat redundancy is very 
lin1ited indeed. Major questions for society to answer are first, is such an imbalanced 
po\ver structure fair and reasonable? Secondly, should most power be concentrated in 
the hands of a minority group, however named, to decide the destiny of the majority? 
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